Aristotle on Prescription

Aristotle’s stance seems to be fairly clear: deliberation is a reasoning about what is useful for achieving an end: τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. The end, therefore, is the necessary starting-point of deliberation, not its object. Hence, the decision, or rather the choice (προαίρεσις), that forms the conclusion of a deliberation is the choice of what has been deliberated because it has turned out to be useful for achieving the end.

Practical syllogism is the logical translation of the psychological unfolding of an action:

"...To syllogize in action is to apply a rule of the form ‘such and such a man should act in such and such ways’ with a view to realizing an end and ultimately, no doubt, the supreme end, happiness. But I am not implying that all the rules which Aristotle might admit as major premisses are in fact rules which prescribe means to ends"

M. Nussbaum openly subscribes to the idea that deliberation is about the components of the notion of the end, not just the extrinsic means to it. Hence, she regards the notion of rule as having a somewhat “instrumental” value. Yet a rule does not coincide entirely with the general norm of which the deliberated action is an instance. A rule sometimes corresponds to an action we choose and perform with a view to a certain end, and whose performing reflects a habit of our character