Qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences. What it feels like, experientially, to see a red rose is different from what it feels like to see a yellow rose. Likewise for hearing a musical note played by a piano and hearing the same musical note played by a tuba. The qualia of these experiences are what give each of them its characteristic “feel” and also what distinguish them from one another. Qualia have traditionally been thought to be intrinsic qualities of experience.

Do You See What I See

Has phenomenal aspects. What could be the representational content of the experience of an orgasm? The nature of the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality has recently generated considerable philosophical discussion. Philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness reduces to intentional content. While-others think the reductive relationship goes in the other direction.

The term “qualia” (singular: quale and pronounced “kwol-ay”) was introduced into the philosophical literature in its contemporary sense in 1929 by <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/lewisci">C. I. Lewis </a>in a discussion of <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/sense-da">sense-data theory</a>.

QUALIA 

Lewis use of the term "qualia" in reference to rhe properties of sense-data themselves. In contemporary usage, the term has been broadened to refer more generally to properties of experience. Paradigm examples of experiences with qualia are perceptual experiences (including nonveridical perceptual experience like hallucinations) and bodily sensations (such as pain, hunger, and itching). Emotions (like anger, envy, or fear) and moods (like euphoria, ennui, or anxiety)

Does It Feel The Same To You

Qualia are often referred to as the phenomenal properties of experience, and experiences that have qualia are referred to as being phenomenally conscious . Phenomenal <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/consciou">consciousness </a>