Lewis use of the term "qualia" in reference to rhe properties of sense-data themselves.

In contemporary usage, the term has been broadened to refer more generally to properties of experience. Paradigm examples of experiences with qualia are perceptual experiences (including nonveridical perceptual experience like hallucinations) and bodily sensations (such as pain, hunger, and itching). Emotions (like anger, envy, or fear) and moods (like euphoria, ennui, or anxiety)

Qualia are often referred to as the phenomenal properties of experience, and experiences that have qualia are referred to as being phenomenally conscious . Phenomenal consciousness

Has phenomenal aspects. What could be the representational content of the experience of an orgasm? The nature of the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality has recently generated considerable philosophical discussion. Philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness reduces to intentional content. While-others think the reductive relationship goes in the other direction.